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Abstract   
In January 2015 the radical left SYRIZA has won the Greek national elections and 
formed a coalition government with Independent Greeks (ANEL), a right-wing 
populist party. After a seven-month negotiation with Greece’s creditors and the 
agreement for the implementation of a third memorandum of fiscal adjustment, 
SYRIZA announced the conduction of a second round of national elections in 
September 2015. After a second electoral victory, SYRIZA formed again a coalition 
government with ANEL. The main characteristic of SYRIZA’s pre-electoral 
campaign was that it has primarily focused on the commitment for austerity measures 
termination and on the implementation of tax alleviation. Even during the second 
electoral campaign in September 2015, after the agreement for the implementation of 
the third memorandum of fiscal adjustment, SYRIZA was promising that its 
implementation will be socially endued in order to reduce negative social 
consequences, such as those created by the previous memoranda. Practically though, 
after the first months of the new memorandum implementation, it is obvious that the 
government has introduced an unprecedented tax policy. Interestingly, this policy is 
not different from a traditional left logic of tax enforcement but actually leads to the 
implementation of horizontal austerity policies which firstly affect the socially 
vulnerable groups. From this point of view, while SYRIZA emphatically declare that 
it aims at resolving the crisis, its policies seem to deepen the depression. For instance, 
its inability to find alternative options to finance the social security system, leads to 
the implementation of restrictive policies which dismantle the welfare state. This 
paper aims at analyzing the policies of the first left government in Greece by focusing 
on the tentative social consequences of the third memorandum and at the same time, 
studying some of the basic factors for its electoral victory, such as populism. 
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1. Introduction  
During the previous five years, Greece has faced economic recession which resulted 
in the direct increase of social and economic problems. The implementation of the 
previous two memoranda of fiscal adjustment was a field for a tough confrontation 
between the parties participating in the governments and those of the opposition. The 
result of this confrontation led to a peculiar distinction between pro-memorandum 
parties, with key exponents the social democratic PASOK and the right-wing ND 
(New Democracy) and antimemorandum ones, with key exponents the radical left 
SYRIZA, the populist right-wing ANEL (Independent Greeks), the Communist Party 
(KKE) and the Neo-Nazi Golden Dawn. The severe criticism of the opposition to 
governments that implemented the previous two memoranda and the promise of 
reversing such policies, led to the electoral rise of SYRIZA and finally to the 
achievement of gaining the first place in the national elections of January 2015. 
Straightforwardly, it turned out that SYRIZA had to make a great shift from utopia 
and the exorbitant promises to realism. Certainly, this shift, coated with populist 
manifestations and with an extensive delay, led to the signing of another, rather tough 
memorandum and to the implementation of policies which actually lead to a cyclical 
continuation of the crisis. During the crisis, the “traditional” parties (PASOK and ND) 
which shared the power throughout the period after the restoration of democracy 
suffered a huge shock and for the first time, in 2015 they do not participate in 
governance. While these two parties used to totally receive over 70% of the votes, 
since 2012 and especially in the elections of 2015, they both barely exceeded 35%. 
Therefore, this is a clear evident of the dramatic change in the political landscape in 
Greece due to the crisis. The enforcement of the Troika (European Central Bank, 
European Commission, and International Monetary Fund) in 2010, for the 
implementation of the first memorandum of fiscal adjustment, mutated the agenda of 
political debate in Greece. From the beginning, the first memorandum was demonized 
by the opposition as it was seen as a tool for the limitation of national sovereignty. 
This was the beginning of the creation of the peculiar distinction between pro-
memorandum and anti-memorandum political sides. The opposition condemned the 
memorandum and advocated the protesting citizens in the streets or in the social 
media. But the fact that the vast majority of anti-memorandum side, with SYRIZA 
having a prominent role after the transition of ND to the pro-memorandum side, did 
not express any viable solution except from the desire for a complete abolition of the 
memorandum and of the austerity measures. This strategy had focused the debate on 
the responsibilities of the Greek government which was succumbing to German 
interests and on those of European partners in general, rather than making a reference 
to the development of a problematic economic model during the pre-crisis period and 
propose effective reforms. The transfer of the responsibility to others, to outsiders, 
affecting in this way the Greek people, is one of the main populist strategies (Smith, 
2012; Doxiadis and Matsaganis, 2012; Mouffe, 2015). Thus, an exogenous enemy of 
“the people” is been created to whom everyone should demonstrate strong resistance. 
According to this logic, even those who reach an agreement with them should be 
considered as their agents and traitors of the people2. As Alexis Tsipras had stated 
during the pre-electoral campaign, SYRIZA will abolish the memorandum and 
implement a program of tax relief and social solidarity increase while encounter the 
interests of the oligarchy3. But when he became the prime minister of the country he 
finally signed the implementation of the third memorandum with lenders, imposing 
severe impact on the Greek society and economy by extending the negotiating period 
and leading the European Central Bank (ECB) to impose capital controls in banking 
transactions. It is true though that the social impact of the crisis, the frustration of     
the people by the implementation of the austerity measures and the populist rhetoric 
of anti-memorandum parties, such as SYRIZA, which promised a total reversal of the 
negative socio-economic situation, led to their electoral rise, since the elections of 
2012. They formed the so-called anti-memorandum side, with SYRIZA becoming 
their leader. However, it is true that SYRIZA has not managed to escape from one of 
the permanent tactics of the Left. This is the increase of public funding through 
taxation. Unlike pre-electoral commitments which promised to abolish taxes and 
create a fairer tax framework, it turns out that SYRIZA, as a government, actually 
increases horizontal taxation affecting thereby the lower socioeconomic groups. 
Certainly, it should be clarified that while a traditional left policy increases taxation in 
order to redistribute and thus to benefit the lower socio-economic groups, SYRIZA 
uses this strategy in a “one-dimensional” character, which practically affects 
negatively the whole society, as long as it facilitates the vicious recessionary cycle. 
As it is visible from the available data, the tax increases that have taken place over the 
last five years have led to a decline in real tax revenue. While tax rates have increased 
in most categories, the absolute figures reveal a decline in real income. Therefore, a 
further increase in the rate of taxation will inevitably lead to a decline in actual 
revenue, create further pressure on household finances and consequently, to deeper 
recession.                                                  
2. The Utopian Pre-Electoral Agenda  
If one studies the pre-electoral agenda of SYRIZA he will find that its proposals-
commitments were focused on reversing the economically restrictive situation by 
implementing a completely differentiated agenda, which was based on the 
abolishment of the austerity policies, imposed by the memorandum, and on the 
restoration of the socio-economic situation almost to the pre-memorandum (pre-crisis) 
period. SYRIZA followed the tactic of demonization of the policies implemented in 
previous memoranda by adopting a grueling rhetoric against them. Under this 
strategy, it promised the increase of social and economic benefits and the denial to 
implement commitments, such as privatizations, agreed by previous governments 4 . 
Specifically, SYRIZA promised the implementation of measures that included the 
renegotiation of terms with European partners regarding the economic policy. This 
strategy, in addition to the “removal” of the Troika and the memorandum, included 
the promise to renegotiate the national debt. The clear objective was the achievement 
of a significant “hair-cut”, and the implementation of expansionary economic policies 
with social content in order to reduce the high rates of social inequality and injustice 
in Greece (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015) 5.   
---------- 
 2 See Alexis Tsipras pre-electoral speech in 14 June 2012, available at http://goo.gl/v2Pce 3  
3 See an extract of Alexis Tsipras pre-electoral speech in 20 January 2015, available at 
http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1231378989 
4 An example is the privatization of regional airports. As the main opposition party, SYRIZA promised 
not to relinquish the regional airports and has accused the previous governments for inciting the Greek 
public interests. For instance, see a relevant statement of G. Stathakis, subsequent minister of SYRIZA, 
in November 2014: http://www.tovima.gr/politics/article/?aid=653906. However, it was SYRIZA-
ANEL government which signed the agreement of concession of regional airports to the consortium 
Fraport AG – Slentel Ltd for a period of 40 years. For further details see:  
http://www.hradf.com/en/news/20151212-regionalairports 
5 According to Bertelsmann Stiftung Social Justice Index for 2015, Greece has the lowest social justice 
rate among the EU member states. 
                
The anti-systemic and radical rhetoric of SYRIZA also aimed at creating an 
unrealistic image of a possible electoral victory; that it would reinforce a significant 
change of the main economic and social policies, not only in Greece but also 
throughout Europe (Gerodimos, 2015). In any case, SYRIZA deliberately cultivated a 
contradiction in its agenda. Although often some of its members were adopting a 
harsh criticism and repulsion on the European Union (EU), all targets were 
surrounded by the mantle of staying in European Monetary Union (EMU) and the EU. 
Importantly, they tried to convince people that they will achieve a more advantageous 
agreement with the EU and at the same time, they willmanage to implement their pre-
electoral commitments, while remaining within the single currency6. However, the 
abovementioned process was implemented through a nearly seven-month negotiation 
which caused a dramatic impact on the economy, as a result of the capital controls on 
banking transactions. The second direction of the pre-electoral strategy of SYRIZA 
included promises, which focused on assuring citizens that even if the negotiations 
would be converted into a conflict with the European partners, SYRIZA had the plan 
to implement its pre-electoral program, which included reduction of the austerity and 
tax reliefs of the lower socio-economic groups. In any case, this assertion was 
accompanied by the certainty that their negotiating capacity and strategy, different 
from the previous governments, will be able to combine the retention in the EU and 
the EMU and the implementation of a new policy mix. Specifically, SYRIZA used the 
concept of “dignity” in order to emphasize the promise of maintaining decent 
pensions and subsidies for the agricultural sector, as well as the abolition of property 
auctions (of the primary house property). Simultaneously, one of the key pre-electoral 
commitments was the creation of a socially just taxation system which will entail a 
tax-free threshold on 12000€ income and the repealing of ENFIA (Single Estate 
Property Tax) 7. 
---------- 
6 See an extract of Alexis Tsipras pre-electoral speech in 20 January 2015, available online at: 
http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1231378989; See also the Thessaloniki program, available online 
at: http://www.syriza.gr/article/SYRIZA---THE-THESSALONIKI-
PROGRAMME.html#.VuUjmvlkjIW                                                                                                             
7 See an extract of A. Tsipras’s pre-electoral speech in January 2015, available online at: 
http://www.avgi.gr/article/5221266/kanena-spiti-se-xeria-trapeziti 
Regarding the social security system and the issues on employment relations and 
rights, except from vague pronouncements on dignity, social justice and confrontation 
of the humanitarian crisis, SYRIZA promised to restore the 13th pension for pensions 
below 700€ while it also announced the increase of the minimum wage to 751€ as 
well as the restoration of collective agreements 8. These pronouncements essentially 
promised the restoration of both the labor and pension policies-benefits to pre-crisis 
levels, as long as SYRIZA believed that it could reach an agreement with partners 
both for the debt relief and for the termination of the austerity policies, essentially by 
not implementing the commitments of the previous signed memorandum. All the 
aforementioned commitments of SYRIZA were embellished with guarantees for the 
struggle against corruption and tax evasion, which have plagued the country the 
previous years. Especially after the agreement on the implementation of the third 
memorandum, the electoral strategy of SYRIZA, for September 2015national 
elections, aimed not only to indicate that the projected measures will not harm the 
lower and the middle social groups but also to express the differentiation of SYRIZA 
with the old parties which ruled the country the past four decades. The introduction of 
SYRIZA as a new political entity which was not involved in the power after the 
restoration of democracy in 1974, aimed at appearing as the single representative of 
“the people”, which is going to collide with corruption and the interests of the elites in 
order to succeed the promotion of the general social interest 9. 
---------- 
 
 
 
 
8 For instance, see the announcements of P. Skourletis, Minister of Labor and Social Solidarity, that 
finally were not implemented, available online at: http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1231380937  
9. The main pre-electoral message of SYRIZA in the September 2015 elections was “We disentangle 
with the past. We gain the future”. This is a clear indication of the concentration of the campaign in 
differentiating SYRIZA with the traditional parties and main opponents (ND, PASOK) by identifying 
SYRIZA as the “new” and the other parties as the “old”, which do not comprise anything new and 
innovative to offer to the country.  For more details see: 
http://www.imerisia.gr/article.asp?catid=39335&subid=2&pubid=113703139 
 
 
As Tsipras stated, “nobody has anything to fear from a fair tax system. The only ones 
who have to fear is the smugglers and fraudsters. These people are included in list 
such as the Lagarde’s list and by now they still remain undisturbed”10.  
 
Figure 1.  Basic Pre-electoral Commitments of SYRIZA (Greek National 
Elections of January 2015) 
 
This strategy, together with the creation of the enemy-friend distinction (European 
partners versus national supporters of austerity termination) is evidence of the use of 
populism on the road to power (Mouffe, 2015). Populism aims at disorienting voters 
from the true potential of the Greek side regarding its claims from the European 
partners. 
 
---------- 
10 See an extract of Alexis Tsipras pre-electoral speech in 20 January 2015, available online at 
http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1231378989 
 
 
 In this context, by addressing the emotional appeal of the people, SYRIZA tried to 
show the strains of a new political scene, accusing both members of other parties for 
corruption and deception of the people. In this way and due to the young age of its 
leader, it won a large part of the voters. Adopting a populist strategy and accusing 
external factors (EU) and other parties that applied the austerity measures without 
even stress any resistance, it attracted voters who finally believed that SYRIZA may 
implement a different policy-mix and at the same time, resist to lenders who try to 
take advantage of the crisis by buying at low prices the Greek public property. The 
sense of subversion of the austerity and the return to an imaginary situation of the 
prosperous past decade has especially attracted young people to vote for SYRIZA. 
 
3. The Disinclination towards Europe and the Illusions of Resistance  
A crucial issue about the strategy that SYRIZA has followed in that it managed to win 
the elections in Greece with a highly critical stance towards Eurozone policies. For 
this reason it has often been categorized as a Eurosceptic party (Rohrschneider and 
Whitefield, 2015; Verney, 2015). While before the elections its oppositional rhetoric 
had a relatively anti-European character, after the electoral triumph and especially 
after the unsuccessful negotiations, it finally changed political direction and identified 
itself as a pro-European party in order to pass the third bailout program (Tsebelis, 
2015). According to Walzer (2015), “SYRIZA came to power promising to address 
the pressure from bankers and EU officials, to end the austerity policies and to 
transform Greece. It was an exciting time, but the party had not already prepared 
plans to put into practice any of these objectives. Moreover, there was no plan for 
“Grexit” - for withdrawal from the Eurozone - for drachma reconstitution and the 
recovery of economic sovereignty”. This mixture of illusions along with the inability 
to present a well prepared program of reforms for the public administration and a plan 
of combating the uncontrolled corruption and tax evasion explicitly increased the 
already extended social and economic problems.  According to Anderson (2015), the 
fiery rhetoric to end the domination of the Troika and to renegotiate the terms for the 
Greek debt payment, comprise factors that significantly contributed to the emersion of 
SYRIZA to power. Furthermore, SYRIZA often used a peculiar combination of 
radical expressions and supplications with reference to the fundamental European 
values. Thus, Anderson believes that this combination was actually incompatible with 
any genuine threat of Grexit and is based on a problematic perception of the 
leadership of SYRIZA, which was not able to distinguish between the Eurozone exit 
and the EU exit. It is true that they have realized that the Greek public is largely 
against a Grexit, as long as most people concede that the Greek standards of living 
have significantly increased due to the Euro accession, the Structural Funds and the 
low interest rates resulting from the convergence of spread throughout Europe. 
Therefore, SYRIZA profusely reassured that there was no question of abandoning the 
Eurozone. The criticism of Anderson (2015) is contradicted by the argument claiming 
that SYRIZA went through a long period of incredible illusions of a dynamic 
negotiation amid Eurozone dissolution threat and amid inarticulate and radical 
opinions of memorandum abolition through “a law with one article”11, until it 
became clear that the fiscal tightening is inevitable in order to avoid the bankruptcy 
and the Grexit.  In this sense, the demagogic rhetoric of SYRIZA for “popular 
sovereignty” does not seem to correspond to the harsh reality as long as “fiscal policy 
in Greece is totally dependent on the whims of the European institutions and this was 
finally accepted by Tsipras” (Fischer, 2015). If we look at what is being 
implementing, “the achievement of the campaign of SYRIZA was a tour de force of 
lies and demagogy that causes nausea” (Fischer, 2015). Secretly though, the Greek 
people have always had the intuition that the probability of memoranda abolition is 
low, unless the country chooses a path other than the Euro. In any case, the anti-
European attitude was a common reference point of the radical left SYRIZA and the 
rightwing ANEL. As Nicoli clarifies (2015: 12), the attitude towards Europe is 
currently the main factor that determines the creation of governmental coalitions. 
---------- 
 
 
11 As the leader of the main opposition party, A. Tsipras declared that SYRIZA will restore pensions 
and wages to the prememorandum levels. See the detailed declaration of A. Tsipras online at: 
http://www.tovima.gr/politics/article/?aid=484094 
4. The Turn to Realism and Its Consequences  
Almost seven months after the rise to power, SYRIZA finally was turned to realism. 
In order to be forced to adopt realism Tsipras and his coalition government had led 
the country to a six-month fruitless negotiations with partners, which nearly brought it 
closer than ever before to a Grexit, by failing to pay a loan repayment to the IMF 
(Khan and Holehouse, 2015) and by the announcement of the conduction of a 
referendum about the proposed fiscal agreement by the European partners 
(Ekathimerini, 2015a). This referendum instead of comprising a concrete democratic 
tool, it turned out to be a tool of its violation. The three main reasons which lead to 
this conclusion are the following: a) the question was about a financial issue, a fact 
that is prohibited by the constitution, b) the period between the announcement of the 
referendum and its conduction was short (only one week) and c) the question was 
unclear. Finally, SYRIZA although it managed to win the referendum, the vote for 
“NO” to the implementation of fiscal measures proposed by European partners, 
ultimately was led to the agreement for a tougher austerity program than that, by 
signing a third Memorandum of fiscal adjustment.  SYRIZA tried to set off the great 
battle given against “lenders” (European partners) and though they signed the new 
fiscal agreement, it managed to win the mandate for its implementation in the national 
elections of September 2015. The referendum was part of the populist strategy of 
SYRIZA which attempted to demonstrate that it predicates political-social consensus 
and the democratic participation of the people in the decisions taken. However, in the 
end, the decision seemed to be in sharp contrast with the public “will”. Under these 
circumstances, Tsipra’s main aim was to show that his government had strongly 
negotiated with “exogenous enemies” and earned an agreement that at least saves 
Greece from bankruptcy and the return to drachma (Klapsis, 2015). What actually 
Tsipras wanted to achieve was the wide public acceptance of the fact that he had 
negotiated as no one in the past and reached an agreement that is tough but it will be 
implemented in order to avoid bankruptcy and total economic and social destruction. 
The government of SYRIZA was already aware that the public opinion, although 
voted for “NO” in the referendum for the implementation of the agreement proposed 
by the European Commission, would never accept a Grexit (Eurobarometer, 2015). 
Exactly for this reason Tsipras, by announcing the referendum, aimed at gaining time 
in order to cultivate the vision that his government had set a strong opposition towards 
the measures proposed by the European partners. This vision was a significant tool for 
the preelectoral campaign of the next elections that he had stimulated, in September 
2015. Furthermore, the snap character of these elections during the summer was one 
more tool for SYRIZA, in order to achieve the parliamentary majority before voters 
realize the real upcoming effects of the implementation of the memorandum (Rori, 
2016).   As the tentative data indicate, the implementation of the third memorandum 
by the specified laws that SYRIZA passed though the parliament, leads to the 
conclusion that the negative social consequences will be further increased. Firstly, 
increased taxation is used as the main strategy of collecting the necessary financial 
resources in order to meet the debt and deficit obligations. But by extensively 
increasing taxation, investments are even more discouraged and a peculiar 
redistribution in a lower level, that destroys the middle socio-economic groups, is 
being implemented. For instance, while before the elections SYRIZA was sharply 
against the property tax (ENFIA), currently, as a government, it has decided that it 
will remain almost unchanged as long as it generates enough revenue to the state 
budget and it is not easy to find equivalent measures (Ekathimerini, 2015b). At the 
same time, in an attempt to gain more funding, the government of SYRIZA increased 
the VAT tax on food products from 13% to 23% and finally to 24% in June 2016. The 
significant increase of this kind of indirect tax comprises a clear horizontal measure 
but indirectly, it primarily affects the lowest income groups, leading to a decrease of 
the real wages (Bloomberg, 2015). At the same time, the increase of a tax which is 
directly related to the consumption amid crisis, inevitably leads to a reduction of the 
spending capabilities and therefore, cause reduction in sales, mainly of SMEs, which 
is a sector that potentially and with the relevant reforms and measures – which do not 
include tax increases - can boost national exports (Nassr, Robano and Wehinger, 
2016). All these measures will clearly lead to a continuation of the recession and 
reduce the purchasing capacity of the Greek citizens, leading to further increases on 
poverty and social exclusion. A clear indication of this fact is that although taxes were 
increased during 2015, the tax revenues were dropped by 1.38% in comparison with 
2014, without adding the tax rebates that are in abeyance (General Secretary of Public 
Revenues, 2016). Thus, while totally there is a proportional increase in taxes, the total 
real revenue had been reduced. It is interesting that the only category of tax that had 
led to increase in real revenues was the deductions from wages and pensions (General 
Secretary of Public Revenues, 2016). This is a clear indication that tax increases 
severely affect the middle socio-economic groups.  
  
                     Figure 2.  Total Tax Revenues 
Source: General secretary of Public Revenues, 2016 
A similar strategy is followed in the social insurance sector, in which, after the 
agreement on the implementation of the third memorandum, structural and restrictive 
reforms are implemented that largely affect pensioners on different socio-economic 
categories as long as they introduce significant cuts in supplementary pensions, 
increases in social security contributions as well as in tax deductions on pensions 12. 
    
 
 
 
 
 
---------- 
 
 
12 For further details on the reductions in supplementary pensions and in the tax increases in pensions, 
see the new social security law of SYRIZA-ANEL government, available in: http://content-
mcdn.imerisia.gr/pegasus/Multimedia/pdf/fekasfalistiko_id3415752.pdf 
 5. Concluding Remarks  
 
It turns out that SYRIZA, instead of implementing a policy which will attract 
investments by reducing taxation on enterprises with a simultaneous commitment on 
investing the profits to the creation of new job vacancies, actually it maintains the 
already large public sector and try through taxation and pension cuts to find the 
required resources. This government perceives Greek people more as national 
taxpayers than as citizens as long as the tax increases, mainly on the middle socio-
economic groups and on private professionals, comprise a central policy tool for 
ensuring budgetary adjustment. The logic of the one-dimensional taxation against the 
total population is embellished by Mr. Tsipras with a supposed intention to a top-
down redistribution. But this intention seems hypocritical, once the middle socio-
economic groups and especially the private sector, since the beginning of fiscal 
adjustment, have mostly been suffered, without concrete economic results on public 
revenues. Moreover, the negotiating strategy that SYRIZA has used put the country in 
front of a great danger of financial and social collapse. The government 
underestimated the negotiating capacity of the country by extending the negotiation 
period and conducting the referendum and instead of gaining a better future for the 
economy and society it signed a tougher set of austerity measures. It seems that the 
main purpose was not to ensure the general interest of the country but the political 
future of the party for the forthcoming period, after the September 2015 elections. The 
endless negotiations and the use of tools such as the referendum targeted only on 
maintaining the vision of SYRIZA as the party of “the people” that had negotiated 
until the end but due to external parameters, several of the - illusionary – pre-electoral 
commitments are not going to be implemented. However, the situation has become 
even worst, considering the management of tough issues such as the current reforms 
in the social security system as well as the management of the refugee problem, which 
clearly indicate the amateur confrontational strategy of the government. All these 
problems accumulate further the social and economic difficulties and often put in 
danger the national interests of the country. It turns out that, the transition of the pre-
electoral expectations into real policy, ended in their total reversal. Thus, despite the 
populist hegemony (Pappas, 2015), in the case of the SYRIZA, leftist self-
determination was reversed into a peculiar mixture of “right, capitulated or even 
neoliberal left”, which reveals a huge gap between promises and implementation 
(Munchau, 2015; Kotroyannos, 2016). The abovementioned policies of this 
government lead to the redistribution of poverty (Rori, 2016), which increases the 
new social group of permanent precarity (the precariat) (Standing, 2011) as a result of 
the transformation of citizens into national taxpayers with limited economic capacity 
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